Abstract. The absence of compensation for third parties who are the victims of residual (that is, permitted) pollution can entail a violation of Rawls's second principle of justice. Environmental pollution, insofar as it is an uncharged cost, may lead also to an economically inefficient distribution of goods and services. Radioactivity and radiation dose are forms of pollution for which a control philosophy has been adopted which demands a consideration of efficiency implications. In addition, a discharger of radioactive waste must ensure that the overall benefits resulting from the waste-generating practice exceed the total costs. But dissimilar distributions of costs and benefits may leave certain individuals worse off as a result of that practice. The use of different schemes of compensation for those adversely affected by radioactive waste repositories is examined.
Introduction
John Rawls's celebrated second principle of justice holds that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are ... reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage ..." (Rawls, 1971, page 60 ). An unequal distribution of economic goods is therefore just only if it operates to the benefit of the least favoured. The physical environment is a source of economic goods, such as raw materials and aesthetic felicity, but in addition it acts as a sink for the disposal of waste products. When pollution of the environment is an 'uncharged cost', an unequal distribution of environmental 'goods' and 'bads' may arise which entails a violation of Rawls's second principle (1) : the polluter enjoys some net benefit from the activity in which an emission arises, whilst others derive no benefit but suffer some detriment from the reduced environmental quality.
Fundamental to Rawls's formulation of justice as fairness is an abstract construct, labelled the "veil of ignorance", under which the principles of justice are chosen by individuals who are unaware of their place in society, their class, wealth, intelligence, or any other attribute. Since each participant has no prior indication of the ultimate consequence for him/herself of any arrangement to which he/she consents, any set of principles so agreed will be based upon general procedural considerations and will be independent of self-interest. Although the ultimate distribution of the costs and benefits associated with any polluting activity may be subject to considerable uncertainty, in practice no environmental decisionmaker is ever in as complete a state of ignorance as Rawls's hypothetical formulation assumes. In any international convention on marine pollution, for example, the British delegate could hardly be rid of all knowledge of the cleansing effect of the Gulf Stream and of Britain's advantageous location relative to it. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that if a veil of ignorance of their geographic positions were to descend on decisionmakers, a more even spatial distribution of costs and benefits would result.
The underlying ethos of the traditional United Kingdom approach to the statutory regulation of pollution has not been concerned with inequities in the M When applied to the distribution of goods and services, Rawls's second principle is equivalent to the more familiar economic criterion of 'Pareto optimality'. For a detailed discussion of social justice, Pareto optimality, and allocative efficiency, see Burrows (1979) . division of net benefits associated with pollution; rather it has favoured controls which are 'practicable' and which serve to maximize the social sum of those benefits, irrespective of their distribution. The social justice implications of residual (that is, permitted) discharge of radioactive waste form the principal focus of this paper. However, the attempt at a pragmatic and empirical analysis of certain current issues might prove to be of relevance to other forms of pollution. Before examining the possibility of compensating those subject to Rawlsian injustice from radioactive effluents, it is necessary to consider the extent to which practicability or efficiency considerations influence the control of this form of pollution.
Allocative efficiency and pollution control
A given distribution of economic goods and bads (of which, pollution is one), although in Rawlsian terms socially unjust, may nevertheless be economically efficient in the utilitarian sense, in that it maximizes the sum of net benefits to society-that is, the total losses of the losers are outweighed by the total gains of the winners. The classical microeconomic analysis of pollution as an uncharged cost is that of Pigou (1920): economic (or allocative) efficiency is achieved when a polluting discharge incurs a tax per unit of emission equal to the cost of the environmental damage caused by that unit of emission. A conventional graphical representation of the socially optimal level of pollution, as given by the intersection of the marginal abatement cost function and the marginal damage curve, is given in figure 1 .
In Coase's (1960) idealization of a free market, the key issue is the ownership of the medium receiving the polluting discharge. If the polluter enjoys an unlimited right to discharge to the environment, a pollutee might choose to negotiate and agree to pay him a subsidy (or bribe) to limit the discharge to a level which he (the pollutee) finds acceptable. Conversely, if the pollutee enjoys a legally enforceable right to a pristine environment, it is for the would-be polluter to persuade him to waive that right on receipt of a charge on emission. Coase's analysis reveals that the finally agreed level of pollution is independent of the allocation of the proprietorial rights: once the rights are clearly assigned, levying a tax on the polluter or the payment of a subsidy by the pollutee leads to the same mutually agreeable and economically efficient discharge.
Bribing a polluter to reduce his discharges would, of course, violate the 'polluter pays' principle (OECD, 1975, page 13) . However, this is not the only, or even the principal, limitation of the role of Coasian bargaining in the regulation of pollution within a modern industrial economy. Property rights are rarely assigned in as unequivocal a way as Coase's analysis requires. The bargaining process may itself incur costs which are sufficient to deter at least one party from entering negotiations. Where a number of pollutees are subject to a source of discharge, an incentive exists for each to exaggerate the extent of the damage individually sustained; and if the pursuit of individual interest does not prevent a bargain being struck, it will ensure that the bargain is not consistent with allocative efficiency. Arguably, a bigger obstacle to the application of economic concepts in pollution control has been the intractability of the problems of quantifying the costs of pollution damage, especially human mortality and morbidity. Yet it is these forms of damage which continue to be the prime source of motivation for the statutory regulation of pollution.
The reluctance of governments and pollution-control agencies to employ economic concepts (and pollution charges and subsidies in particular) to promote allocative efficiency within environmental regulation has led to a "near perfect vacuum of experience" according to one observer (Bower et al, 1981 , page 2). The study which led to this observation had been concerned primarily with controls over water pollution; had its remit been extended to include radiological protection and controls over the disposal of radioactive wastes, evidence of the influence of economic ideas might have necessitated a rather more equivocal conclusion.
Radiological protection and efficiency
In 1977 the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) published a number of proposals on the limiting of radiation dose uptake, not only by those occupationally exposed to radiation sources but also by members of the general public. The need to take account of allocative efficiency is implicit in the second of the ICRP's three recommendations (ICRP, 1977, para. 12) :
"(a) no practice shall be adopted unless its introduction produces a positive net benefit; (b) all exposures shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable [ALARA], economic and social factors being taken into account; and (c) the dose equivalent to individuals shall not exceed the limits recommended for the appropriate circumstances by the Commission." In response to a Direction by the Secretary of State for Social Services, the National Radiological Protection Board (2) expressed the view that the ICRP proposals provided "... a satisfactory basis for controlling the exposure of persons to ionising radiation in workplaces and in the general environment" (NRPB, 1978) .
An earlier version of the first and second recommendations had been introduced in a subsequently superseded ICRP (1959) publication: "... all doses to be kept as low as practicable and that any unnecessary exposure to be avoided". In fact, this precept [as well as the observance of a critical group dose limit similar in purpose if not in detail to (c) above] has been fundamental in the application of the Radioactive Substances Act 1960 (RSA, 1960) , the principal statute empowering the Secretary of State (for the Environment) to regulate the disposal of radioactive wastes. A White Paper explained that, in order to secure permission to discharge such wastes to the environment, it would be necessary, in addition to meeting the existing ICRP dose limits, "... to do what is reasonably practicable, having regard to cost, convenience and the national importance of this subject, to reduce the doses far below these levels" (MHLG, 1959, para. 117) . In the ICRP recommendations of 1977, the need for a microeconomic calculation "... for deciding what is reasonably achievable in dose reduction" is expressed explicitly: the basic principles of costbenefit analysis are presented, complete with differential calculus notation, and this technique is advocated as the appropriate means of identifying the point at which additional dose-limiting measures would no longer be justified by the corresponding reduction in risk (although observance of the dose limit of 5 mSv is, of course, paramount) (ICRP, 1977, para. 73) .
After its endorsement of the current ICRP (1977) recommendations, the National Radiological Protection Board published a further advisory note (NRPB, 1981) on the use of cost-benefit analysis in the derivation of an optimum level of protection of the general public from routine (that is, nonaccidental) discharges of radioactivity into the environment. After circulating a consultation paper (NRPB, 1980) which reviewed the relevant literature on alternative methods of assessing health detriment, including valuations of human life, the Board grasped the nettle and specified money costs for collective dose equivalents (3) made up of different ranges of individual doses (see figure 2). The near linear relationship held to exist between dose and the probability of incurring cancer or genetic defects in subsequent generations can be used, in conjunction with these figures and the appropriate risk factors, to derive estimates for the cost of averting a fatal cancer or an hereditary defect.
It must be stressed that the figures published by the NRPB (1981) do not alone amount to a marginal cost curve. However, they can be used by a member of an exposed population to determine the valuation the nuclear industry might place upon the dose that individual had received. Suppose a rational and economically minded man were to become aware not only of the NRPB figures but also that in the preceding year he had incurred a dose equivalent of say, 0.8 mSv, as a result of the discharges from a nearby nuclear installation. He might then argue as follows: if I were to be one of 1250 individuals receiving such a dose, our collective dose would amount to 1 man Sv; this unit of collective dose (when made up of individual doses of 0.8 mSv) is considered by the nuclear installation operators to
Individual annual dose equivalent (Sv) Figure 2 . National Radiological Protection Board collective dose estimates (NRPB, 1981) . < 3 > 'Dose', or more strictly 'dose equivalent' (measured in sieverts) is a measure of the deleterious effect of ionizing radiation on human tissue. 'Collective dose equivalent' (measured in 'man sieverts') is a measure of the health detriment of an exposed population. It is equal to the sum of individual dose equivalents incurred within that population, and when multiplied by the appropriate factor (10~2 per man sievert) gives an estimate of the likely number of cancers to arise in that population as a result of the exposure to radiation. cost £50000; therefore I (and my fellow sufferers) should each receive £40 in compensation. Had his dose been 5 mSv, his demand might be £250. This example is not merely of theoretical interest, for it has been stated that:
"By far the most significant dose resulting from discharges of radionuclides from the Windscale and Calder Works in 1980 was the 16.3% of the ICRP dose [0.8 mSv], mainly from radiocaesium, to members of the critical group consuming fish, crustaceans and molluscs. Doses to typical members of the general public from the consumption of fish were very much lower and of the order 1% of the ICRP Dose Limit" (BNFL, 1980, para. 34) . Thus there does indeed exist a group of individuals who might feel aggrieved should they doubt that the benefits they enjoyed in 1980 as a direct or indirect result of the reprocessing of nuclear fuel were equivalent to any sum less than £40.
The NRPB (1981) advisory note was not intended to be used by a member of any critical group to evaluate the putative cost of the dose incurred. It was seen as no more than an initial attempt at a quantitative framework to assist those whom the second ICRP recommendation (ALARA) obliged to use cost-benefit techniques when deciding on limits to dose reduction measures. Nevertheless, these figures, or any others for that matter, in which a monetary valuation is made of radiation dose equivalent, whether collective or individual, can always be used in quasi-Coasian bargaining. The pollutee may not have proprietorial rights which can be invoked to forbid the dose-generating discharge. But advantage can be taken of a polluter's desire to acquire or maintain a reputation for fairness towards his neighbours in order to minimize the risk of local hostility to his continued operation.
It might be argued that civil law provides a forum where such an aggrieved pollutee might engage in Coasian bargaining in order to secure compensation commensurate with the dose being incurred from the discharges from a nuclear site. This may be true in the case of an accidental release which exceeds the authorized limit. Indeed, for the more important class of installations which come under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Installations Acts (NIA) of 1965 and 1969, compensation of victims of a nuclear incident is on a statutory basis (with an upper limit of £5 million set on the total compensation payable per incident, S.19 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965). But for routine, nonaccidental emissions within the relevant authorized limits, it is improbable that these could ever constitute grounds for a successful action in nuisance, trespass, the rule (4) in Rylands v Fletcher (1886), or any other of those common law remedies which, before the advent of statutory controls, afforded the only sanctions against polluters (McLoughlin and Forster, 1982, page 23) . A riparian owner downstream of a point of discharge of active effluents might well enforce the right to receive a natural flow of water unaltered "in its character or quality" [John Young v Bankier Distillery 1893) . But the discharge of radioactivity to the sea infringes no rights as such, even though it leads to the contamination of fish and other seafoods. For atmospheric discharges of radionuclides, a successful action in private nuisance would need a demonstration of an unreasonable interference in the enjoyment of land; and under Rylands v Fletcher a plaintiff would have to establish that the emission arose from a use other than "the ordinary use of the land or such use as is proper for the general benefit of the community" {Richards v Lothian 1913).
Support for this view of the likely response of the courts to claims of negligence and nuisance arising from authorized discharges may be inferred from a case (4) "A person who brings onto his land, or collects there something likely to do mischief if it escapes, owes to others a duty to prevent such an escape. If he fails in that duty he will be liable to any who has suffered damage as a natural consequence." (McLoughlin and Forster, 1982, page 25). 1980) in which the parents of two children, allegedly injured by organic lead in petrol, sued two oil companies using these antiknock additives and sought an injunction restraining their future use. The companies argued that at no time had they violated the limit on lead in petrol prescribed by the Secretary of State under the Motor Fuel (Lead Content of Petrol) Regulations 1976 (DoT, 1976 ) made pursuant to the Control of Pollution Act 1974 (CPA, 1974, S.75) . The Court of Appeal held that this fact was not itself sufficient grounds for dismissing the actions. However, this limit (and by implication any other specified in legislation delegated to the Secretary of State) had the tacit approval of Parliament. If the courts were then to impose by injunction a lower limit, the authority of Parliament would be undermined by "a constitutional anomaly which would be wholly unacceptable" (Megaw L J in Budden v BP Oil Ltd and Another 1980) .
{Budden v BP Oil Ltd and Another
There is one reason why the ruling in this case need not prove binding in any comparable action in respect of active emissions from a nuclear installation: the certificate of authorization under the Radioactive Substances Act (RSA, 1960) is specific to a site and does not have the same authority as the nationally applicable regulations governing the lead content of petrol. But the principle underlying the Budden case is in keeping with what has been recognised (Macrory, 1983, page 160) as a tendency for the courts to imply an immunity from common law action for industries or industrial installations, the existence or operation of which has been the subject of specific statutory provision. In this regard, the Special Development Order [TCP(WCW), 1978], granting planning consent for the BNFL Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant at Sellafield, is but the most recent in a series of ad hoc legislation establishing (albeit with varying degrees of parliamentary scrutiny) the present UK complement of nuclear power stations and chemical plants.
Radiological protection and social justice
Given the limitations of common law remedies, it is necessary to consider whether a case exists for instituting an alternative means of compensating third parties for residual pollution. In doing so, account must be taken of the less obvious economic goods as well as the bads stemming from the polluting activity. In the example cited above, the pollutee is not employed by the reprocessing company and he is not a shareholder; however, he benefits indirectly from the rates which the company pays to the local authority and which that community would lose were excessive fears over pollution to force its closure or relocation. Moreover, power generation is an economic activity from which he, as a consumer of electricity, benefits and of which nuclear fuel reprocessing is one part. Notwithstanding, he might still argue that he merits compensation: it is his proximity to the plant which leads to his dose uptake; residents at the other end of the county benefit equally from the company's rates; and electricity consumers at the furthest end of the national grid are no less beneficiaries of the power supplied.
With any spatially dispersed distribution of nuclear installations (reactors, chemical plants, and military establishments), there will be a related distribution of dose equivalents and of health risk among the (nonoccupationally) exposed population. If this latter distribution is not congruent with the distribution of economic benefits stemming from the radiation generating activities, then inequity arises. As Rawls (1971, page 284) himself points out, differences in the temporal distributions of benefits and costs can also violate his second principle of justice. Intergenerationally just procedures can result when they are devised by individuals who, under the 'veil of ignorance', are unaware of their ages, generation, and the particular stage of industrial development attained by their society. (Although the geological timescale of the threat posed by the longest-lived components of nuclear waste has sharpened social awareness of this issue, it must be remembered that the environmental costs of discharges of heavy metals, dioxins, polychlorinated biphenyls, and other toxic compounds also extend over periods far greater than those of the benefits which their use entails.) Current social concern over radioactive waste will ensure that any future disposal of such waste, whether on the seabed or in favourable geological formations, will be permitted only when that waste is confined by an appropriate number of enduring barriers. Knowledge of the mechanisms by which these barriers might be breached and of the rates at which various radionuclides will eventually return to the biosphere is subject to considerable uncertainty. Collective doses to subsequent generations can therefore be estimated only in terms of probability distributions (Hill and Webb, 1985, page 32) .
If the collective dose generated in the /th year is equivalent to a money cost C, with an associated probability distribution p(Q), then the expectation value C, is given by ptOQdC,-, 
In order to assess the total or time aggregated cost C, future contributions must be weighted by a suitable discounting factor (see Freeman, 1977) , where r is the (present, market) rate of interest. Such an assessment of the total radiological risk would be necessary in observing a proposed revised version of the second ICRP principle: "the total risks (ie. the risks to populations) from waste management, including disposal, should be as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account" (NRPB, 1983) . If the benefits resulting from a dose-generating practice also extend into the future and if they too cannot be quantified without uncertainty, then an equivalent formalism can in theory be used to yield expressions for the expectation values of benefits, B ( , and the sum of discounted benefits, B. ICRP recommendation (a) might then be revised so that a risk-incurring practice is justified only if those risks can be shown to be less than the associated benefits (that is, C < B).
Such a criterion would be consistent with a utilitarian conception of justice. However, its observance would be heavily dependent upon the assumed discount factor. By choosing any nonzero interest rate r and setting the upper limit of the summation (3) high enough, the most heinous future damage costs can be offset by trivial amounts in current prices. An alternative conception of justice would require that no practice be commenced unless no year (or generation) exists for which the anticipated costs exceed the benefits (Q < B { for all /). This far more conservative conception (see Page, 1977 ) is independent of discount rate as well as being closer to a Rawlsian standpoint.
But although it is possible to construct a theoretical formalism in the belief that the equity implications of radioactive waste disposal can be considered within existing economic techniques (such as those applied in determining a Paretooptimal rate of consumption of minerals and other nonrenewable resources), there are compelling reasons why risk-benefit analysis is of questionable validity as an aid to decisionmaking in this particular area.
Any benefits accruing from a practice such as nuclear fuel reprocessing are realized only when the separated plutonium is reused, either within the fuel elements of a fast breeder reactor or as part of a thermonuclear warhead. In the first case, a commercial demonstration fast breeder reactor has yet to be ordered within the United Kingdom, and even when it is, the benefits in terms of money value of the power generated will depend upon a number of factors currently capable of estimation only with varying degrees of certainty (for example, total energy demand, availability of alternative sources of energy, consumer preference). Similarly, any current estimates of the money value of the benefits conferred by basing national defence upon nuclear deterrence are (quite strikingly) contingent upon the continued success of that policy.
The uncertainties inherent in attempts to quantify future benefits arising from current dose-incurring practices stem from an inability to predict policy choices in ensuing generations. Energy demand can be forecast; scenarios may be drawn; various energy-supply options may be formulated. But attaching an a priori probability on a cardinal scale to each option can hardly be justified; a Delphi technique to rank perceptions of likelihood is perhaps the most that can be entertained. There are some aspects of risk assessment which are less methodologically impoverished: historic data on local seismic activity, for instance, can be used to estimate the probability of a repository being ruptured by an earthquake; existing knowledge of corrosion of metals and of the transport of radionuclides in various soils does allow estimates to be made of potential rates of dose uptake. Although the probability distributions referred to in equations (1) and (2) may in reality be complex functions of numerous geophysical and biological parameters, the use of such functions is contingent upon the not unreasonable assumption of the time-invariance of the physical and geological properties of the repository and its surroundings.
In contrast, any assessment of benefits will depend not only on certain numerical parameters, such as discount rate, but more significantly upon a complex framework of beliefs about the future organization of society and its ability and willingness to exploit nuclear technology and the notional assets hitherto acquired, not only reprocessed plutonium but also technical expertise. Furthermore, any assumption concerning an indefinite ability to maintain surveillance over waste repositories, to prevent both deliberate and accidental entry, or to monitor discharges is similarly a reflection of a belief in the durability of social institutions capable of achieving these ends rather than a matter of confidence in the reliability of technological systems.
Compensation
This paper has not distinguished between the case, say, of sea discharge of active effluent from nuclear fuel reprocessing at Sellafield and the effects of leachate from future repositories of low and intermediate levels of (solid) radioactive waste. Both pose involuntary risks to third parties; risks that potentially outweigh the benefits which might accrue to them from the practices which lead to the environmental disposal of radioactive materials. But when attention is focused on arrangements for compensating such third parties, a distinction must be drawn. Figure 3 reveals that the activity discharged over the last thirty years into the Irish sea will continue to result in dose uptakes by various critical groups, in the range of 1%-10% of the ICRP recommended limit of 5 mSv, for well into the next century. Even if discharge were to cease immediately, the curve would be little changed, for it is predominantly past effluents which account for present and projected doses. Residential patterns around Sellafield may change and consumption habits may vary, but the data in figure 3 may be accepted with a confidence which exceeds that accompanying any estimate derived from the probability distributions (see above) of dose uptake from as yet unbuilt repositories of low or intermediate level waste in favourable geological formations. The half-lives of the nuclides in such waste and the timescale of the processes which would erode their containment are such that the greatest radiological risk is borne by distant generations. The inherent inequality in the distribution of net benefits is therefore a temporal one. Long-lived nuclides (such as plutonium, half-life 24000 years) are present in the Sellafield effluents, but the fall-off in doses to the critical groups of seafood consumers, exhibited in figure 3, derives mainly from the decay of the shorter-lived components, notably caesium 137 (half-life 30 years). Marine discharge from Sellafield therefore appears to require a scheme of compensation to redress what is essentially an unequal spatial distribution of the net benefits to stem from the reprocessing of nuclear fuel.
A quasi-Coasian approach might be for British Nuclear Fuels Limited to 'buy out' the right, hitherto enjoyed by members of the critical groups, to eat locally caught fish and molluscs or to live in boats over the active silt in Whitehaven harbour. Clearly such a scheme is open to abuse through, for instance, spurious claims of reluctantly foregone habits of fish consumption. But insofar as the compensatory payments were related, albeit crudely via the NRPB (1981) scale, to environmental costs, the scheme could be consistent with allocative efficiency. With regard to ICRP recommendation (a), such a scheme leaves unaltered the global sum of net benefits stemming from the practice (nuclear fuel reprocessing) from which the active effluents arose; but it would redistribute benefits and costs so as to reduce the potential for Rawlsian injustice.
It might be argued that annual dose equivalents in or around the range of 0.05-0.5 mSv, and attributable to any nuclear installation, should go uncompensated, because natural background doses within the United Kingdom show a much greater range (1-100 mSv per annum) (RWMAC, 1985, para. 3.11) . Thus a Cumbrian fish-eater could receive compensation even though his total dose (natural plus anthropogenic) remained well below that of an inhabitant of an area (such as Aberdeen) remote from any nuclear site but subject to high background radiation (from the underlying strata of thorium-rich granites). But although the Sellafield critical group dose amounts to a fraction of the natural background, it represents an additional, finite and involuntary risk of health detriment. An apprehension of an adverse difference between that increment of risk and the benefits which might be enjoyed as a result of nuclear fuel reprocessing might have induced a member of that group to forbid the practice, had the power been available to the individual from the outset. Although the House of Commons (HC, 1986, para. 128 ) Environment Committee was recently left in no doubt that existing contamination of Cumbrian estuaries means "that the Irish Sea deposits will be a source of radiochemical pollution for many years to come", it did not advocate compensation for members of the public adversely affected. But with regard to the future terrestrial disposal of radioactive waste, the Environment Committee (HC, 1986, para. 245) recommended that:
"... the Department of the Environment should give serious consideration to the issue of compensation to those affected by the establishment of radioactive waste disposal facilities." The Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive (NIREX) has given little information on the nature of the compensation it is considering but it has indicated that a planning agreement (under S.52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971) with the local planning authority for the area of any chosen site might prove an appropriate framework for some compensation scheme. In the past, the use of such agreements to enable developers to "buy planning approval" by the provision of community projects unrelated to the approved development has been criticized (Heap and Ward, 1980) . Equally there is evidence (Miller and Wood, 1983, page 205) of the use of these agreements to enable planning authorities to extend their powers of control over potentially polluting development and thereby mitigate local opposition to such proposals. Enforcement of the terms of a planning agreement is by action in the High Court; with a planning condition there is provision for the developer to appeal to the Secretary of State in the event of any dispute with the planning authority over its enforcement. A compensation scheme under the former might therefore be viewed with less suspicion by the local community if the judiciary is felt to be a more disinterested arbiter of environmental issues than the political head of the government department which originally approved the site for radioactive waste disposal.
Irrespective of the procedures finally chosen for the administration of any compensation scheme, the exercise must be seen within the context of the nuclear industry's desire to counter the climate of public mistrust which recent incidents at Sellafield and elsewhere have engendered. Hostile local opinion is recognized as the principal impediment to the selection of new sites for the disposal of low-level waste. Any negotiation over compensation between the waste disposers (NIREX) and the body representing the affected community (the local authority, or a joint committee if the site lies close to a distinct boundary) will inevitably be denounced as "bribery" by the more implacable local objectors. The proposal to make compensatory payments to communities adjacent to any site is therefore best understood as an anticipated reply to the accusation "it's not fair", which is now subordinate only to that of "it's not safe" in the typical local reaction to nuclear site selection.
In one proposal referred to by the Environment Committee (HC, 1986, para. 240 ), a high rateable value would be placed on a waste repository, and central government would ignore the rate revenue thus generated in calculating the rate support grant, so ensuring that compensation remains with those notionally most at risk. The actual distributive effects of such a scheme could be revealed only by a site-specific study. Nevertheless, it would appear a priori to be less potentially regressive than a scheme believed to have been operated in France (HC, 1986, para. 240 ) under which electricity charges were halved for consumers living within fifty kilometers of a nuclear power station: the benefits of nuclear power lie in the utility of the goods (the electricity) produced; thus those who consume most will benefit even further by a reduced tariff; whilst similar, or even greater, environmental costs may be borne by those who consume less.
In addition to examining the distributive effects of any compensation plan, NIREX must also consider whether it should operate retrospectively. The disposal by shallow landfill of low-level waste at Drigg near Sellafield began in the 1950s. Geological features and tipping practice at the site are such that the horizontal movement of contaminated groundwater into the local watercourse and then to the Irish Sea cannot be prevented. Even though discharges are small (compared with those authorized through the nearby Sellafield pipeline), this philosophy of 'dilute and disperse' is unlikely to be sanctioned in future sites (HC, 1986, para. 72) . Although the radiological risk posed by active leachate from the site is negligible, the present (and future) inhabitants of Drigg village can be said to have no less a claim to compensation than those living near any future site, where risks can be safely assumed to be smaller still.
Any concession over Drigg could well be followed by demands for compensation within the much greater area notionally at risk from Sellafield's discharges, both marine and atmospheric. Residents near existing and proposed nuclear installations (power stations and military establishments such as Aldermaston) might then be encouraged to make similar claims. The NIREX offer could be seen as an encouraging precedent by those apprehensive about permitted discharges from nearby installations, both landfill sites and incinerators, disposing of nonradioactive but chemically toxic wastes.
Notwithstanding the possible 'knock on' effects, the NIREX offer is to be welcomed for a number of reasons. First it can enable compensation to be paid in respect of the 'blight' or nonradiological impacts occasioned by such development, not only the short-term fall in house prices but also the noise and general inconvenience caused by the construction and loading of a repository. Second, it signals a reversal of a policy which has hitherto held third-party compensation to be unnecessary once a nuclear installation is licensed and officially considered 'safe' in its design and its operation. But perhaps most significant it establishes a precedent, following which it will be difficult for future nuclear decisions to be reached without an examination of their equity implications. However, it must be remembered that the more fundamental question of the temporal distribution of the full environmental costs of radioactive waste disposal remains unanswered.
